This is a PDF file of an unedited manuscript that has been accepted for publication. As a service to our customers we are providing this early version of the manuscript. The manuscript will undergo copyediting, typesetting, and review of the resulting proof before it is published in its final form. Please note that during the production process errors may be discovered which could affect the content, and all legal disclaimers that apply to the journal pertain.
A C C E P T E D M A N U S C R I P T

Monetary and Macroprudential Policies in an Estimated Model with Financial Intermediation
Paolo Gelain * and Pelin Ilbas † February 24, 2017
Abstract
We estimate the Smets-Wouters model featuring the Gertler-Karadi banking sector on US data using real and financial observables. We investigate the gains from coordination between a flexible inflation targeting central bank and a macroprudential regulator charged with safeguarding financial stability. The potential gains from coordination depend on how much importance is given to the output gap in the macroprudential mandate. Coordination conflicts can be avoided by assigning similar importance to this common objective in the respective mandates of both policies. When we derive optimal mandates for monetary and macroprudential policy under no-coordination, we find that both policy makers should place a higher weight than society on the output gap.
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